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Abstract 
 
In view of the obligations undertaken by Hungary in the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the need to meet the requirements of 
the EU regulation intended to foster the implementation of reducing greenhouse gas emissions through an EU-wide cap-
and-trade system, Hungarian authorities will soon have to decide on the highly sensitive question of how emission 
rights among regulated firms should be allocated. Because different distribution methods might result in substantially 
different outcomes on the financial situation of firms, how the ownership of allowances should be transferred to 
regulated companies is one of the most heavily discussed questions. Moreover, emission rights of different countries 
under the Protocol might be of high value for the governments of countries which are likely to become net sellers at the 
allowance market and possess extra amount of assigned emission units over their actual emissions (so called “hot air”), 
so the issue of who should benefit from the possible gains also arises. This paper suggests a theoretically desirable 
solution to the problem in view of the delineating EU regulation and the common arguments for and against the free 
allocation of ownership rights to firms. Given that the outcome of the proposed solution is difficult to reach through 
actual regulation, we also discuss the practical feasibility of the suggested way of allocation. 
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Összefoglalás 
 
A kiotói vállalások teljesítésére irányuló európai szén-dioxid kibocsátási kvóta kereskedelmi rendszerben való 
részvételi kötelezettség miatt hamarosan döntenie kell a magyar hatóságoknak arról, hogyan történjen a szennyezési 
jogok kezdeti allokációja a szabályozás által érintett hazai vállalati körben. Mivel a különböző kiosztási módok igen 
eltérő hatással lehetnek a vállalatok anyagi helyzetére, a kezdeti allokáció kérdése a szabályozás igen kényes, sokat 
vitatott pontja. Mivel Magyarország a kiotói egyezményben meghatározott kibocsátási limithez képest jelenleg többlet 
emisszióval (un. forró levegő), valamint jelentős elhárítási potenciállal rendelkezik, nagy valószínűséggel nettó 
eladóként fog fellépni az egységes európai piacon. Felmerül tehát a kérdés: Ki részesüljön  az emissziós jogok 
birtoklásából származó esetleges haszonból? A tanulmány egy elméleti megoldást javasol a kiosztás problémájára a 
formálódó EU szabályozás által megszabott keretek, valamint az ingyenes allokáció mellett és az ellen felhozott érvek 
figyelembevételével. Mivel az elméleti megoldás igen szigorú kezdeti feltevésekre épül, a dolgozat a javasolt módszer 
gyakorlati alkalmazhatóságának kérdésére is kitér. 
 
 
Kulcsszavak: kiotói egyezmény, szén-dioxid kibocsátás, emisszió kereskedelem, kezdeti allokáció, szennyezési jogok, 
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Introduction 
 
Under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol, governments, as Parties to the Protocol, made legally 
binding commitments to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in period 2008 – 2012 by an 
overall 5,2 percent compared to 1990
1. The European Union seeks to achieve the targeted reduction 
by outlining a European cap-and-trade programme, in which large emitting sources of all member 
countries would be obliged to back up each ton of their carbon-dioxide emissions by freely tradable 
emission allowances. As Hungary is one of the newly joining members of the EU, it has to align its 
greenhouse gas regulation with that of the Union.  
The latest, amended proposal for the EU Directive on emission allowance trading
2 
prescribes that each member state has to develop a national plan regarding 1) the amount of 
allowances it intends to allocate for the emitting sources covered by the directive, and 2) the 
methodology to be used in the design of domestic allocation.
3 Annex III of the document lists some 
obligatory criteria concerning the allocation methods and states that the national allocation plans are 
subject to the approval of the Commission before their implementation. Thus, other member states 
and the Commission will have a chance to assess the distributional effects on the relative 
competitiveness of firms of the different allowance allocation regimes. ”Too generous” national 
allocation plans might be deemed as illegal state aid and be banned by the Commission.  
Two trading periods are specified in the proposal: a trial period between 2005-2007, and the 
Kyoto commitment period 2008-2012. In the first period allowances have to be grandfathered 
(firms should get free access to the emission quotas), while in the second period maximum 10 
percent of the allowances might be auctioned by national governments. This fact has to be taken for 
granted when designing the domestic allocation system, whereas the decision on how strict caps to 
set for the companies and what methodology to use for the distribution is left to the discretion of the 
national authorities.   
The first part of the paper describes why allowances embody quite specific ownership rights, 
and why the ownership issue is a central question in designing the initial allocation. The second 
section provides a brief overview of the possible ways in which emission allowances can be 
assigned to individual plants, and overviews the most important criteria for national allocation plans 
set by the proposal for the EU directive. Next, our theoretical solution for quota allocation is 
presented. We assume a highly liquid European emission market, in which the firms and the 
government face a constant European allowance price. We also presume that marginal abatement 
cost curves of individual firms are perfectly envisaged and known to the regulatory authorities, and 
no transaction costs are present. Because the proposed allocation method relies on assumptions that 
obviously do not hold in reality, the last part of the paper examines whether regulating authorities 
can reach similar results and to what extent the proposition can contribute to policymaking.  The 
last section includes a summary.  
 
 
The ownership of emission allowances 
 
The Kyoto Protocol has allowed post socialist countries to fix their GHG reduction commitments 
relative to the peak emissions of their foregone heavy industry, thus accounting for the substantial 
                                                 
1 The benchmark years or periods (the “base periods”) set in the Protocol differ from country to country. 
2 Amended Proposal for the Directive of European Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse 
gas emission allowance trading within the community. COM(2002)680. 
3 COM(2002)680, Article 9/1   4
decrease in their emissions that resulted from the fall of production in the period of industrial 
restructuring. For Hungary the protocol sets the objective to mitigate CO2 emissions by 6 percent 
compared to the average amount released in years 1985-1987. Although emission projections made 
under different scenarios are dissimilar, it is obvious that the GHG emissions of the past years fell 
short of the level in the base period. According to the national inventory report to the UNFCCC
4 the 
total amount of GHG released by Hungary in the base period was 101.6 million tons in CO2 
equivalent while in 2000 the total emissions amounted only to 84.2 million tons. Although 
business-as-usual emissions might slightly overpass the assigned limit according to some 
projections
5, official estimates suggest that the country can meet its obligations without taking any 
actual domestic measures. (KvVM, 2002)  
The structure of Hungarian GHG emissions indicates that the energy sector is responsible 
for over 42 percent of CO2 released in the country, which highly exceeds the average proportion 
typical of this sector in the EU countries (30%) as well as in the OECD countries (33%) (KvVM, 
2002). Indeed, the energy efficiency of power stations operating in Hungary lags much behind the 
average in developed countries (Szabó, Szabó, 2001), consequently, we can suppose that there is a 
substantial potential for adopting efficiency improving technologies.
6 The second largest GHG 
emitter sector is the agriculture, with a share larger than the contribution of total transportation.
7  It 
is likely that  limitations of EU agricultural production quotas would eventuate in the withdrawal of 
a quarter to a third of the arable lands from cultivation (Ángyán et. al., 1997) contributing to 
substantial additional GHG abatement. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assert that Hungary is very 
likely to become a net seller on the market of allowances, and benefit from selling its AAUs 
(assigned amount units)
8. 
As it was the government who took responsibility in the Kyoto Protocol for curbing GHG 
emissions, the question arises: Who shall own the allowances? The commitment made by the state 
might of course be shifted to individual firms under domestic regulation accompanied by relevant 
enforcement systems, the ultimate liability at the international level, however, falls on the state. 
Thus, the permits carry rather specific ownership rights.  
The government could appear in the allowance market as a seller or buyer, and could retain 
the ownership of the permits, without transferring the ownership rights of emission quotas to firms.
9 
However, in order to achieve the cost effectiveness the tradable quota system offers, it is desirable 
to involve as many firms as possible in trading. One of the most important effects of regulation 
through marketable permits (similarly to emission taxation) is that it induces firms to invest in 
abatement technologies. As the theory suggests, when firms need to hold allowances equal to their 
emissions resulting from their operations, they are impelled to reduce their emissions by investing 
in new technology as long as their marginal abatement costs are lower than the price of allowances, 
under conditions of perfect competition. (Pearce, Turner, 1990) In view of this fact it is obvious that 
the more investment happens in the country, the more benefits can be achieved, as further 
abatement means more quotas available for sale to other countries where additional abatements can 
                                                 
4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (www.unfccc.org) 
5 See for example the database of UNECE/EMEP (http://www.emep.int/emis_tables/tab7.html).   
6 For an examination of the energy efficiency and possible impacts of GHG regulation on the Hungarian industry see 
Ürge-Vorsatz and Szeszler (1999), Zilahy (1999) and Zilahy and Zsóka (1998). 
7 The cultivation of agricultural land results in the emission of N2O, a gas with 310 times higher global warming 
potential than CO2. 
8 The unit of the targeted amount of emissions set in the Kyoto Protocol for each participating country. 
9 Although, under some emission scenarios there is a need for some measures to be taken to meet the Kyoto 
requirement, which means that the government may need to impose emission taxation upon companies or include them 
in the cap-and-trade regime.   5
be realized only at higher costs. Besides this, of course we should not dispense of the fact that the 
environmental quality of production improves significantly in the country.
10  
According to the ownership theory of the firm, when the right to residual returns remains 
with the same agent who has the residual rights of control, and all contractual payment obligations 
are fix amounts or fix proportions of the income, maximizing the value for the owner means 
maximizing the value for all the partners involved.
11 When one has both the residual right to return 
and residual right of control, pursuing its own goals and maximizing its own income will lead to an 
efficient solution. (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990. Milgrom, Roberts, 1992) As 
we saw, one of the most important factors that determine the possible costs/benefits of emission 
trading is how firms will decide about investing in abatement technologies. Firms, themselves, have 
the private information on their own technologies, and having the residual claim over their pollution 
rights would encourage them to utilize their abatement opportunities to the largest extent possible. 
Thus, the ownership rights should be definitely delegated to the firms, but whether the rights are 
given to them free or for a fixed amount, would not alter the nature of their decisions, given that 
they do not face substantial transaction costs. (However, the regulation can trigger liquidations in 
case the permit system places too big burden on firms.
12) 
Several studies deal with the idea that environmental regulation induces innovation and can 
help to narrow the so called “energy efficiency gap”
13 (e.g. Jaffe, Stavins 1994a, 1994b, Newell et. 
al. 1998; Jaffe et. al. 2000), as environmental regulation changes firms’ cost structure, what in turn 
impels them to save on their costs related to pollution. Much of the literature argues that Hicks’ 
theory of production factor efficiency applies to CO2 emission allowance as a newly emerging 
production factor. Porter suggests, in his famous hypothesis, that through this induced innovation 
and technology adoption regulated firms can actually gain competitive advantage over their 
unregulated competitors. (Porter, Linde, 1995) Others argue specifically that auctioning the 
pollution permits causes better incentives for innovation and new technology adoption than free 
allocation (Milliman, Prince, 1989; Cramton, Kerr, 2002).  
According to the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960) the initial distribution of the ownership 
rights does not alter the efficient outcome of the internalization of negative environmental 
externalities if certain assumptions hold (well defined property rights, zero transaction costs and no 
wealth effect). It does, however, have a huge wealth distribution effect that manifests itself in the 
financial situation of the parties involved. In view of the fact that whoever has the allowances might 
realize gains by selling them, the question arises: should the firms or the government receive the 
benefits that the allowances embody? In case the allowances are given to the firms free of charge, 
they might realize substantial gains by implementing investments in abatement technologies and 
selling allowances afterwards with a net profit, while if the government auctions the emission 
quotas for them, they might either need to incur costs of abatement or to purchase additional 
allowances. Theoretically, their investment decisions are not altered, as they perceive either the real 
or the opportunity cost of emission rights.  
                                                 
10 Improving energy efficiency means that less primary energy input is needed for the same volume of production, an 
option very much favoured by environmental policy. Moreover, switching to less carbon intesive fuels (e.g. from coal to 
natural gas) tend to decrease the amount of other non-climate related environmental damages. 
11 Residual right to return refers to the income that the owner of a given asset receives after all contractual payment 
obligations were met. Residual control means that the owner can make decisions related to the asset and have 
bargaining power over the asset in situations not covered by any contract. 
12 On the relationship of carbon regulation and the shut down decision of firms and the desirable government policy in 
case of information asymmetry between the firm and the authorities see Jejberg, Lando, 1997 and Hagem, 2001. 
13 The energy efficiency gap refers to the fact that in spite new energy saving technologies that would enable firms to 
realize negative cost efficiency improvements are available in the economy, much of these stay unexploited.    6
There are several arguments for the state to receive benefits from selling the AAUs the 
country possesses. First of all, (as we pointed out earlier) by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol it is the 
government that undertook the legally binding obligation, so the final liability of meeting the 
country’s commitment remains with the state. Also, the country possesses an excess amount of 
emission rights that was achieved through the negotiations carried out by the government 
representatives under the UN Framework Convention. Moreover, the non-avoidable effects of past 
GHG emissions on the climate will call for adaptation measures in the country that will need 
substantial financing in the future (e.g. irrigation of drought smitten lands or flood prevention). To 
create the institutional background for implementing the regulation of tradable emission allowances, 
a number of administrative tasks will have to be completed, which will also require resources from 
the state budget. The state administration can largely contribute to the mitigation of the transaction 
costs faced by companies that engage in trading by spreading relevant information and working out 
transparent rules.
14 For all these reasons, it seems reasonable that the government should retrieve 
some funds from the allowances available for sale.  
The economic argument for such an allocation is that, by doing so, the government can not 
only trigger abatement technology investment and emission reduction, but also can raise income for 
the state budget. If this is designed to be fiscally neutral by means of revenue recycling or offsetting 
through tax reductions the government can decrease overall tax distortions in the economy. There is 
an ongoing dispute among economists on the possibility of turning government revenues from 
environmental regulation to the alleviation of distorting tax burden. On the so-called “double-
dividend” issue see for example Oates, 1995, Goulder, 1995, 1997.
15  
The common argument for the free allocation of pollution rights to firms is that as a result 
of the introduced carbon regulation they will be obliged to submit an amount of allowances equal to 
their total emissions in every period, although they did not take this extra cost into consideration 
when deciding on investments in their present technologies. Therefore, the emitting firms will have 
to incur some sunk costs, or stranded costs for which they might justly demand compensation. 
(Harrison, Radov, 2002). 
 
The allocation of rights 
 
As it turns out from discussion above, regulation through allowance trading represents 
theoretically the least cost approach to mitigate CO2 emissions, the initial allocation of emission 
rights, however, can have significant effect on how the burden of paying for the externality is 
shared among the different actors. The design of initial allocation of emission permits is indeed one 
of the most heavily discussed and debated issues.
16  
Harrison and Radov (2002) provide a detailed discussion of the available allocation 
options, including the description of the major allocation alternatives and the most important 
valuation criteria for the various mechanisms. They distinguish three basic alternatives for the initial 
allocation: 
1.  Auction (selling quotas to firms through a properly designed auction) 
2.  Grandfathering (free allocation to firms based on their historical emission information)  
3.  Updating (free allocation to firms based on periodically reviewed information over time) 
                                                 
14 Although we must note, that state administration also entails transaction costs, which as to be taken into consideration 
(Coase, 1960, Szakadat, 1995, Svejnar, 1998).   
15 Several studies have suggested recently that even a stronger interpretation of the double dividend may hold. On the 
case of tax-preferred consumption being present in the economy see Parry et al., 1997. 
16 Among others, Woerdman (2000) argues that the issue of permit allocation will induce heavy political debates, and 
might retard the implementation of GHG emissions trading.    7
They also list the basic metrics that can be used for allocations (input-based, output-based, 
emission-based), and draw attention to the importance of choosing the proper time period for 
computing the relevant measures. The paper includes an in-depth comparison of the different 
methods according to all criteria
17.  
Annex III of the proposed directive lists some criteria for the national allocation plans, to 
which member states have to conform. Among others it is stipulated that the “Quantities of 
allowances to be allocated shall be consistent with the potential, including the technological 
potential, of activities covered by this scheme to reduce emissions.” (COM(2002)680, Annex 
III/(3)) the plan is required to be conform with the existing EC legislation, should take “early 
action” into consideration (investment in abatement technologies prior to the period used to 
measure historical emissions), and should make it possible for new entrants into the regulated 
industries to get access to the amount of quotas they might need.
18  
One additional point shall be considered regarding the often-cited argument for   
‘accounting for early action’. The concept suggests that if a firm has ‘voluntarily’ abated some of its 
emissions before the initial allowance allocation occurs, the government should reward that by 
providing emission allowances to cover the original pre-abatement emission volume. Any stricter 
allowance limitation would ‘penalize’ firms that have made environmental investments. However, 
post socialist governments implementing this concept to their regulation may open the Pandora’s 
Box of never ending claims by firms that had to cut down on their production throughout the 90’s.  
 
 
A theoretical solution for the initial quota allocation 
 
Our question is now the following: How can we implement an allocation in a way that a) 
companies are induced to abate emissions up to the theoretical optimum point, b) companies receive 
their claimed compensation for the stranded costs that result from the regulating measures, c) the 
government retrieves as much benefit as possible?  
In the first period of the proposed EU emission-trading scheme, the allocation has to 
happen through “grandfathering”. This means that the government cannot receive income from 
firms by auctioning them the quotas, therefore, it cannot benefit from the AAUs of the country 
unless it keeps the ownership of some of the rights. Because the directive leaves the decision open 
on how many allowances to distribute to the companies, the state would have the incentive to 
distribute less permits to the companies than their projected emissions, and offer the rest for sale.  
Because firms in Hungary seem to have the potential to mitigate emissions at a low 
marginal cost, providing them with all their required pollution rights for free might mean notable 
rents for them in the form of windfall profits, which one can perceive as a kind of free transfer from 
the government to the firms, what opposes the polluter pays principle
19.  
We can presume that imposing a somewhat stricter cap on the GHG emissions of 
companies would not mean extra financial burden on them, in fact they may still realize positive 
returns. Estimating the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves of the individual power plants could 
                                                 
17 Their paper also overviews the existing and proposed marketable permit systems in the world, and can serve as a 
good guide for the allocation design process. 
18 This is one of the reasons why states will need to hold some allowances on reserves. 
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help the authorities to identify how the strictness of the cap set for the firms would effect their 
financial situation.
20   
The figure below shows a hypothetical marginal abatement cost curve for a set of firms 
with some negative cost abatement opportunity as a function of emissions (or decreasing 
abatement)
21. Given that Hungary is a small state, with a relatively small amount of assigned 
amount units, we assume that the emitting firms as well as the government are price takers in a 
relatively huge, highly liquid European allowance market. We assume that there is no information 
asymmetry between the individual firms and the regulating authorities, and companies do not face 
any transaction costs related to their abatement technology investments and allowance trading. We 
also presume that the set of technology options available for the companies and the related costs do 
not change during the relevant compliance period. 
The marginal abatement cost curve MAC(q) depicted on the picture is a continuous, 
monotonically decreasing function of the level of emissions q. Less emissions (or more abatement) 
entail higher marginal costs at an increasing rate, when one graphs abatement costs as a function of 
abatement, thus more emissions are associated with lower marginal costs in our graph, so we 
assume that MAC’(q) <0 and MAC (q)’’<0. We use this curve shape in our figure to facilitate 
graphical exposition, but we have to note that the actual MAC curves companies will face are step 
functions with unique shape for each firm with different technological features. The step functions 
experienced by the firms or authorities are presumed to be of similar characteristic in the sense that 
at higher additional abatement levels additional costs raise at an increasing rate, and higher 
emission rates mean lower marginal abatement costs, correspondingly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Point q0 denotes the zero emission point (which is obviously not included in the domain of the 
marginal abatement cost function), qi represents the emission level before the regulation comes into 
effect (initial emission level), and P* is the level of constant European allowance price. Points q1, 
                                                 
20 One important thing, however, that has to be taken account of is that limiting the possible gains achievable by the 
Hungarian firms might effect their relative competitiveness compared to foreign firms, in case other member states turn 
out to be more generous towards their companies. 
21 The fact of negative cost abatement option is not necessary for finding the solution. 
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q2, q3 are various levels of post-abatement emissions arising after the new CO2 allowance trading 
regulation is implemented and emission allowances are allocated to the firms. 
In case firms receive the amount of allowances equal to their historic or predicted BAU
22 
emissions, they would receive quotas of value AJHC from the government. Because of their 
perceived opportunity costs, they would abate up to the point where MAC(q) = P* (point q1 in the 
figure), what would cost them money equal to the difference in areas BID – IJK
23. They would 
submit q1 amount of allowances to the authority to back up their remaining emissions, and by 
selling  (qi - q1) amount they could earn revenues equal to the area of the square BKHD. Thus, they 
would benefit the area DHJ, which might be regarded as a free transfer from the state, and one can 
argue that this is not in conformity with the polluter pays principle.  
Since both the government and the firms face the same European price, whether the firms 
or the government sell the allowances does not make difference in terms of the revenue receivable. 
Finding the appropriate allocation cap, therefore, means an amount of freely provided allowances at 
which firms are neither suffering a stranded cost, nor gaining a windfall profit. This solution would 
be the point, where firms receive just the amount of allowances which leaves them with exactly 
zero costs (or zero profits). Because firms need to submit allowances for each ton of CO2 they 
release, and they perceive both the cost of purchasing additional allowances and the opportunity 
cost of not selling allowances, they would in any case choose to abate up to the optimal amount q1.  
The amount of freely distributed allowances to the firm would be at a point like  q2 on the 
graph. If this is the point determining desired cap on the firm’s emissions (not considering the 
amount of allowances at point q1 that they receive and then surrender) the firm receives the value 
corresponding to area BGFD for free, while it has to incur the cost equal to the area under the MAC 
curve (BGED+EGI-IJK), and can sell allowances of value DEF. So, we are looking for a point q2, 
where  
 
(BGFD – BGED) – EGI + IJK = 0,   or 
 
DEF – EGI + IJK = 0 
 
Technically,  
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22 Business as usual 
23 If no cost-effective abatement options are available IJK=0, non-existent, a case which would not effect our basic 
argument.   10
This way of allocation does not put companies that took early measures to mitigate their 
emissions at a disadvantage, albeit it does not reward them either for their early action, given that 
each company faces the same costs (zero costs).  
 
 
Practical feasibility 
 
Of course, the authorities will never have perfect information on the MAC curves of 
individual firms, but trying to approach this point could result in valuable revenue for the 
government. Therefore, besides the equity considerations of the applicable allocation method, the 
question of feasibility is also important to examine. In reality, emission trading systems are diverted 
from the theoretically efficient outcome by a number of factors, of which the most important ones 
are: 1) concentration on the market of products, 2) concentration on the market of pollution rights, 
3) pursuing goals other than profit maximization, 4) effect of existing regulatory environment, 5) 
degree of control and enforcement, 6) transaction costs (Stavins, 1995). A detailed discussion of 
these factors would reach beyond the topic of this paper, so we confine ourselves only to the 
question of how to implement an allowance distribution to have an outcome that approaches the 
ideal situation.  
Under the influence of the above-mentioned diverting factors the government would find it 
impossible to identify the single optimum distribution solution, but still has a good chance of 
keeping the feasible distribution in the range of outcomes that can result in a second best solution. A 
second-best allocation would keep the costs of companies at zero while allowing for some windfall 
profit to emerge over zero at the expense of allowances retained by the state. Such a solution would 
be feasible because firms are easier to involve under such terms compared to the optimum 
conditions. By the symbols of the above figure, the range of second-best solutions is between points 
q2 and qi, (or more strictly q3) the closer to point q2 the better. 
Getting access to the intrinsic knowledge of firms is not only impossible, but even firms 
themselves may lack perfect information regarding their actual abatement options prior to 
regulation. However, authorities will possess some information on the firms covered by the system. 
The proposed EU directive sets out the rules for applying for “greenhouse gas emissions permits”
24 
as well as monitoring and verification, which require firms to submit detailed information on their 
operations, technical data regarding their installations, and the inputs they use. The general 
principles of verification listed in Annex V of the provision states that emissions from different 
sources are going to be subject to verification, carried out by a verifier expert on site. These 
reporting obligations will decrease the information gap between the companies and the authorities.  
One possible way of determining an appropriate cap for the firms could be to ask firms 
themselves to provide data on their own expenses (allowing for a reasonable level of transaction 
costs) what could be reviewed by the regulator using the available data on firms. In this way the 
administrative expenditures would not increase significantly, and some deviation from the true 
values in the direction of the firm’s advantage would not mean a big tort for the society, as firms 
would still be impelled to exhaust as much of their abatement opportunities as possible. 
 
 
Summary 
 
                                                 
24 It is important to note here that “permits” defined in the proposed EU directive (a licence that entitles its licensee to 
release GHG into the atmosphere) are not analogous to the “allowances” (tradable quotas allowing their owner to emit 
one tonne of carbon-dioxide).   11
Our paper investigated the problem of initial quota allocation of greenhouse gas emission rights in 
case of a country that is likely to become a net seller at the market of a unified European allowance 
market. The basic question of the study is how to transfer ownership rights of emission allowances 
to firms in a way that 1) it is in the interest of firms to invest in abatement technologies, 2) they do 
not incur stranded costs as a consequence of the regulation 3) they do not gain high profits resulting 
from the regulation that can be regarded as undue state support and opposes the “polluter pays” 
principle, 4) the government can receive as much revenues as possible from the assigned amount 
units possessed by the country. The benefits raised by the government can then cover the 
administrative expenses related to the regulation, can be turned to managing the future 
environmental effects of unavoidable climate change and might be used to reduce tax distortions. 
Under the assumptions of well-known static marginal abatement cost curves for the relevant 
compliance period, no information asymmetry between firms and the regulation authorities, no 
transaction costs, and treating the firms as well as the government as price takers in a relatively 
huge European market, we suggest that the authorities should allocate an amount of free allowances 
to firms that they incur zero costs (or don’t realize windfall profits) as a result of the cap-and-trade 
program. Given that the government does not have access to the private information of firms on 
their abatement opportunities, we propose a way of determining a cap that is close to this solution 
based on the self-acknowledgment of companies that would be subject to control by the authorities 
based on the accessible information on firms. A solution that is between the amounts of projected 
emissions and the abatement level corresponding to zero costs (as close to the latter as possible) 
could already mean valuable fiscal revenue for the government, while still ensuring investments in 
abatement technologies and the subsequent improvement of the environment. 
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